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INTRODUCTION
In this paper the general pattern of world population growth and the variations
by major world region are discussed. Comments on the relationship between
population growth and economic development are included, but discussion of the
implications of population growth for resource utilization is omitted, since the
other papers in this symposium deal with this topic. Finally, the likelihood of
short-run fertility declines in the developing nations is discussed, with the sugges-
tion that certain social structural conditions must be present if successful popula-
tion-control programs are to be enacted by the developing nations.
WORLD POPULATION GROWTH
This September, 1968, there are approximately 3.5 billion humans living on
this earth, and, in the next twelve months, we will add about another 70 million.
Not only are we living in the period of man's greatest population size, but the
rate of human population growth in the world today is the highest in man's history.
And this growth rate has been accelerating rapidly in recent years. In 1945 the
world's annual population growth rate was estimated to be about 1.0 percent.
By the mid 1950's, the rate was about 1.5 percent and currently the annual growth
rate figure is about 2 percent per year (Thomlinson, 1967).
Another way to assess the historical trend in human population growth is to
note the length of time required to reach each additional billion of population.
The world's population first attained the one billion figure around 1820. The
second billion was reached 90 years later—1930, and the third billion only 30
years after that—1960. Thus, while it took hundreds of thousands of years for
the first billion to be reached, the second billion took only a century, and the third
billion only 3 decades. According to current estimates, the fourth billion will
be reached in 1975, the fifth billion by 1985, and the sixth billion by 1995. So,
by the next turn of the century, there will be over 6 billion humans alive on the
earth, claiming resources, necessitating social adjustments, and affecting the
quality of human life (Hauser, 1963).
Considered differently, the increasing rate of human population growth can
be seen in the amount of time required for the population size to double. The
human population doubled between 1650 and 1850—a period of 200 years. It
took only 80 years for the population to double again—1850 to 1930. And it will
double again in less than 35 years (Thomlinson, 1967, p. 14).
DISTRIBUTION AND REGIONAL PATTERNS
The relatively high rate of world population growth is not shared equally
by all nations. Rather, there are considerable variations among countries in their
annual rates of growth. The highest growth rates today, and therefore the most
formidable and pressing social and economic problems, are faced by the nations
least able to deal with them—by the nations characterized as having already
high densities, low incomes, poor living levels, and ineffective programs for economic
development. The present annual growth rates in such areas of the world generally
are in excess of 2 percent and in some cases are over 3 percent. Illustrative of
high-growth-rate nations are the following (those countries with annual growth
rates over 2 percent):
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Thailand 3.0 percent
Turkey 2.9
Pakistan 2.8
Peru 2.8
India 2.3
Countries with moderate growth rates are those with rates between 1 and 2 percent
per year:
Canada 2.0 percent Nigeria 1.4 percent
USSR 1.7 " France 1.3
United States 1.6 " West Germany 1.3 "
Argentina 1.6 " Poland 1.3 "
Countries with fairly low rates of population growth are those with rates below
1 percent per year:
Japan 0.9 percent Czechoslovakia 0.7 percent
Spain 0.8 " Italy 0.6
United Kingdom 0.7 " Hungary 0.4 "
Another way of grouping the world's nations is in terms of both their present
density and their expected rates of growth in the last half of the twentieth century.
On the basis of these criteria, United Nations demographers have suggested that
there are four major categories of nations (United Nations, 1958):
(1) Regions of low density and modest growth (Anglo-American, temperate Latin
America, USSR, and Australia). While such nations have little population
pressure, they do experience subtle but important demographic problems,
such as the assimilation of rural migrants to their cities.
(2) Regions of low density and rapid growth (Africa, New East, and most of Latin
America). These nations are experiencing a surplus of people who must be
integrated into their economic system, which is in many cases fairly inelastic.
(3) Regions of high density and modest growth (nearly all of Europe fits here).
Even given their low birth rates, maintenance of adequate living standards
is a serious problem. England is an example of one such nation.
(4) High density and rapid growth (here would be included most of Asia and, in
effect, about half of the world's population). It is in such nations that the
pressure on resources is the greatest and where the most severe levels of
poverty exist. The problems of such people are the most critical and to
date have defied most attempts at their solution.
The major reason for the world's population explosion has been the dramatic
reduction in mortality. In the western nations, the death rates have been falling
for about 300 years. Generally, the process of industrialization has revolutionized
productive, distributive, and medical systems so that one major benefit of tech-
nological change has been a reduction in the risk of mortality. In the newly
emerging nations, mortality reduction came at a later time, but was no less
dramatic than it was in the West. The newly emerging nations did not have to
reproduce the industrial revolution themselves for their mortality to decrease,
but, rather, they benefited directly from their increasing culture contacts with the
already technologically advanced societies. Thus, in a sense, mortality decline
diffused from the industrial to the non-industrial societies.
An examination of current death rates (that is, the number of deaths per 1,000
population per year) shows the following variations for the world's regions:
Total World 16 South America 16
Africa 23 Europe 10
Asia 20 North America 9
The relatively recent decline in death rates for the newly emerging areas can
be seen in the figures for Mexico and Singapore:
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Mexico
Singapore
Death Rates
1940
23.2
20.9
1950
16.2
12.0
1960
11.4
6.3
In both of these areas the death rates have been cut more than half in only
20 years.
Reasons for the major mortality decline in the world are: the increasing
efficiency in the production, storage, and transportation of agricultural goods;
the breakdown in the isolation of local community groups; the emergence of
industry and the transformation of the labor force; the widening base of the
distribution of societal products, as reflected in rising levels of living; and the
advances in curative and preventive medicine, especially in regard to control of
the highly contagious diseases.
While mortality has dropped dramatically the world over, fertility has not
experienced the same decline; in fact, in some areas of the world, it is maintaining
its very high rate. Only in the mature industrial nations do fairly low fertility
levels occur. While the number of live births per 1,000 population members
per year for the total world is 36, the values are different in other parts of the
world:
Africa 46
South America 42
Asia 38
North America 22
Europe 19
In the industrialized nations, fertility decline has accompanied the shift from an
agricultural to an industrial economy. Illustrative of this trend is the United
States. The crude birth rates for this country during its recent period of indus-
trialization are:
1909.. .
1910
1920
1930
.. ..30.0
30.0
27.7
21.3
1940
1950
1960
1965
19.4
24.1
23.7
19.4
Thus in 66 years, the birth rate of the United States has been reduced by about
one-third. This decline has been matched by declines in the other industrial
nations. Current birth rates for some of the western European nations are:
France 18.1 Hungary 13.1
West Germany. 18.5 Poland 18.1
United Italy 20.0
Kingdom. . . .18.8 Spain 22.2
At this point two questions may be posed: why has a decline in the birth rate
accompanied industrialization in the West? Will this trend likely characterize
the newly emerging nations in the near future?
Several reasons can be given for the fertility decline that accompanied indus-
trialization in the west (Stockwell, 1968).
(1) The emergence of the factory system brought about an alteration of the
production system, so that manufacturing was removed from the home.
This meant that a sharp separation between place of residence and place of
work was created. This had a negative impact upon fertility, since it meant
that women who wanted to supplement the family income and had many
young children to care for in the home could do so only with difficulty.
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(2) Fertility decline was also influenced by the growth in productivity that
accompanied industrialization. Increased productivity meant that less
human labor was required to produce a given amount of agricultural or
industrial goods.
(3) The process of urbanization (or the shift of the population from rural to
urban areas) was also a factor in fertility decline. Historically, cities have
had the lowest levels of fertility. There are two reasons for this. First,
children are less likely to be an economic asset in the city than on the farm,
so that the urban child played only a limited role in family productivity.
Second, the extensive overcrowding and generally unsanitary living conditions
characteristic of the early industrial city did not encourage people to achieve
high fertility levels.
(4) The gradual decline in the death rate also stimulated fertility decline. A
lower mortality rate among infants and children meant that a larger propor-
tion survived to adulthood. Thus it was no longer necessary for a couple
to have a large number of children to be assured of having some survive to
help them in their old age. Also, the lengthening of adult life meant that
offspring who had to wait for their inheritance before they were in a position
to assume responsibilities had to wait longer. Ireland is illustrative of this
pattern. Obviously, by delaying marriage until later in life, the number
of years for the production of children is reduced.
(5) Industrialization also brought about a basic value change in Western society
that had a depressive effect upon fertility. The small family norm emerged
and it was largely associated with the decline of the family as a unit of eco-
nomic production. Thus children were no longer viewed as an economic
asset and became to be viewed as co-consumers, with their parents, of the
income generated by the adults. It had become clear, in the process of
industrialization, that, at a given income level, there was an inverse relation-
ship between number of children in the family and the level of living.
(6) The increasing technology of birth limitation devices also of course con-
tributed to fertility decline. The condom, the pessary, the diaphragm, the
contraceptive pill, and the inter-uterine device—each have played an impor-
tant role in aiding in the reduction of fertility among users desiring fertility
reduction.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POPULATION GROWTH
At this point it may be asked whether the fertility decline that has accompanied
industrialization in the West will also characterize the newly emerging nations
in the near future? The answer to this question must be a gloomy NO! There
are two main reasons for this. First, the type of change required in a society to
bring about the alteration of the value system dealing with family life and the
place of children in the whole scheme of existence that becomes manifest in a
fertility reduction took several generations to evolve in the West and currently
there is no reason to believe that such a gigantic normative change in the emerging
nations can occur faster. Second, in the West, industrialization created an
industrial and occupational structure that transformed the total fabric of society.
For the social change to take place, industrialization was the necessary ingredient.
In the newly emerging nations today, the process of industrialization is sputtering.
The sheer population-size and rate of population growth in these countries are
making impossible the scale of industrial development necessary for the type of
social structural change that would bring about a fertility reduction. These
countries are caught up in the most vicious of vicious circles. They cannot reduce
their rate of population growth until they industrialize, and they cannot indus-
trialize until they reduce their rate of population growth. They are over their
heads in a morass of economic and demographic problems. They are badly in
need of help on both fronts: economic development and fertility control.
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The inverse relationship between economic development and national popula-
tion growth rate has been well illustrated by current research.
Edward Stockwell has attempted to discover if annual percent increase in
national population size was related with annual percent increase in per capita
income (Stockwell, 1968). Stockwell argues that per capita real income is one
of the most significant measures of national economic development. He notes:
The movement of per capita income is highly correlated with other changes in the
social and economic welfare of a society, and the direction and speed of this movement
is a rough but reliable indicator of the extent to which a society is becoming better or
worse off. Thus, by considering the relationship between annual rates of population
growth in the underdeveloped countries and corresponding rates of increase in per capita
income, it is possible to illustrate the adverse effects of rapid population growth on the
economic progress of the so called 'have not' countries of the world (Stockwell, 1968,
p. 185).
In using data for the 1950's, Stockwell found that the highest rates in increase
in per capita income were achieved by those countries with the lowest rates of
increase in population growth and, conversely, the lowest rates of increase in
per capita income were for those nations with the highest rates of population
growth (Stockwell, 1968). More specifically, for countries with average annual
rates of population growth under 1.0 percent, the annual rates of increase in per
capita income roughly averaged 6 percent per year. Countries with moderate
rates of population increase (that is, between 1 and 2 percent per year) had an
average rate of increase in per capita income of 2.5 percent. And those countries
with rates of population growth in excess of 2 percent had a very low average
rate of annual increase in per capita income of less than 2 percent.
Thus Stockwell concludes and we must agree:
This evidence strongly suggest that economic progress would have been greater if
their populations were not growing so fast. The implication here is clear: the rate at
which the poverty-stricken nations of the world improve their level of social and economic
well-being will depend largely on how successful they are in curbing rapid rates of popula-
tion growth. This in turn means that the future well-being of these underdeveloped
countries will be largely determined by the speed with which the diffusion and acceptance
of effective methods of birth control bring about substantial reductions in fertility (Stock-
well, 1968, p. 187; see also Stockwell, 1962).
POPULATION CONTROL POLICY
At this point one may ask about the probability that national fertility control
programs can be sufficiently effective means of lowering birth rates to encourage
economic growth. To date such programs have met with only limited success.
The reason for this is that the fundamental assumption of the programs has been
wrong. Past programs have assumed that most people want fewer children and
that all that needs to be done is to furnish the people in the underdeveloped nations
with birth control devices and a little encouragement, and the people would do
the rest. This simplistic assumption has led to failure and frustration among
programatic demographers, human biologists, and medical specialists. This
assumption ignores the fact that human behavior is a product of the total social
structure and that, for fertility reduction to be brought about, the total social
structure must be favorable to the necessary behaviors.
What are the prerequisite social conditions that must obtain for population
control programs to be successful? They have been summarized by Sty cos and
Back (1964) as:
(1) Favorable Goals. There must be a shared social norm that the most desirable
number of children is somewhat less than biological capacity. Not only
must individuals want small families, but they must interact with others in
a supportative social melieu.
(2) Knowledge of Effective Contraceptive Means. It is surprising how few women
in both the developed and underdeveloped nations have a thorough under-
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standing of the most effective means of birth control. Here is a major focus
for educational efforts.
(3) There must be positive attitudes toward effective contraceptive means. Here
religious values and moral principles come to play. We cannot expect
persons to adopt improved contraceptive devices unless the devices are seen
by the people as useful, "moral", and non-cumbersome.
(4) There must be physical availability of contraceptive devices. Knowledges of
devices favorable attitudes toward them must be supplemented by easy
access to necessary materials.
(5) The role relationship between husband and wife or between mating male and
female in the society must be one in which the couple can legitimately discuss
their sex life and their plans for contraception with each other.
and
(6) The small-family goal must be of high salience so that people will strive to achieve
it.
If future population-control programs are to be successful, then serious con-
sideration needs to be given to the total social situation. The hour is late and the
challenge is clear; only the question remains as to the willingness of the developed
nations to assume the leadership, which is theirs by default.
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